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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a formal model of endogenous country formation and of choice of
defense spending in a world with international conflict. The model is consistent with three
observations. First, secessions and, more generally, break-up of countries should follow a reduction
in the likelihood of international conflict. Second, the number of regional conflicts between smaller
countries may increase as a result of the break-up of larger countries. Third, the size of the peace
divided -- i.e., the reduction in the defense spending in a more peaceful world -- is limited by the
process of country break-up.
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The end of the cold war has been accompanied by a sweeping process of
democratizatio~ creation of new countries and political separatism. However, even though
the probability of a confrontation between the two blocs of the cold war era is greatly
diminished the number of localize~ regional conflicts has not decreased; several observers
have in fact argued that one should expect more regional conflicts after the end of the cold
war.
This paper provides a model which is consistent with both these observations. First,
it implies an increase in the number of countries as a consequence of a reduction in the
probability of international conflict. Second, it argues that a reduction in the probability of
conflict among a few large countries, by increasing the number of smaller countries, may
increase the number of conflicts between the more numerous, smaller independent political
units. A related observation concerns the extent of the “peace dividend,” i.e., the reduction
in military spending following the end of the cold war. Our model suggests that the
worldwide “peace dividend” may be smaller than one might expect. The reason is that the
per capita costs of defense may increase in smaller countries that have to deal with more
numerous potential regional conflicts.
This paper joins two strands of the analytical literature. One is the economic
literature on the size of countries, as in the work by Friedman (1977), Casella and Feinstein
(1990) and Wei (1992).’ Specifically, we build upon Alesina and Spolaore (1995), where
‘For recent surveys, see Alesina, Perotti and Spolaore (1995) and Bolton, Roland andSpolaore(1995).2
we model the equilibrium number of countries as emerging from a trade o~ the benefits of
economies of scale in the production of non-rival public goods against the costs of
heterogeneity in the population, h the present paper an additional benefit of size arises from
the consideration of potential international conflicts and the cost of defense. The second line
of research is the literature on conflict resolution and arms races recently surveyed by
Sandier and Hartley (1995). Classic references are Schelling (1960), Boulding (1962),
Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) and Ttilock (1974). In particular, in our formalization of the
technology of conflict resolution, we follow Hirshleifer (1989, 1995).2
This paper is organized as follows, Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
illustrates the ‘domestic’ equilibrium on the choice of defense and non defense spending.
Section 4 characterizes a symmetric equilibrium in which the number and size of countries
is endogenously determined. Section 5 discusses issues of stability, and specifically,
unilateral secessions. The last section concludes.
2. The Model
The world is modeled as a segment of length normalized to 1.3 The world population
has mass 1 and is uniformly distributed on the segment [0, 1]. A coun~ is defined by two
borders and anon-rival public goo~ which we label the ‘government’. Each individual can
‘See also Tulloek (1980) and Gtidel (1994).
3Wewuld model the world as a circle, but this modeling choice, even though it would produce qualitatively similar
results would introduce mecessary applications,3
only use one public good, i.e., 1 government, and individual utility is decreasing in the
distance from the government of the country to which the individual belongs. The distance
of individual i from his government is denoted ii. We assume that this distance captures
both a geographical and a preference dimension. That is, being “far” from the government
implies being distant both in geographical location and preferences; in other words, if two
individtis live fm from each other, they ae also distant in preferences. Hence, the location
of a government captures both a position on an ideological dimension and on a geographical
line. As discussed in more detail in Alesina and Spolaore (1995), this assumption ensures
that countries are geographically connected. An alternative assumption would be to retain
only the preference interpretation of distance and then impose costs on non geographically
connected countries. For the purpose of this paper the “preference” interpretation of distance
is not necessary, although it makes the model richer.
Individual utility is given by:
Ui=zi-ti-gli (1)
where Zi is the total income available to individual i , ti are his taxes, li is the distance of
individual i fi-omhis govemmen$ and g is a positive parameter. Thus, individual utility is
linear in private consumption (zi - ti ) and linear in the distance from the public good.
The utility deriving from the public good is highest for li = O.4
The cost of a government is K, irrespectively of the size of the country. This
specification captures in the simplest possible way the benefit of “size” of a country.4 In
facg with a fixed cost of government the average per capita cost of financing is decreasing
with the size of the country.
In reality, the benefits of country size derive from several fixed costs, including
creating and maintaining a monetary system, a bureaucracy, a tax collection system. Also,
in a world of less than perfect free trade, the size of markets is affected by the size of
political jurisdictions, In the extieme case of complete autarky the two coincide: the market
size is the size of the country. Thus, in any model with increasing returns in the size of the
market economy, and some barriers to international trade, income is increasing in the size
of the country.5 Also, even though this argument is not explicitly accounted for in the
model, a large country can provide insurance to its regions, needed because of regional
idiosyncratic shocks.b Thus, in equilibrium the size of countries emerges from a trade-off,
Large countries can take advantage of the benefits of size, but are less homogeneous since
a larger popdation has more diverse preferences. As the size of a country increases, the cost
per capita of government decreases, but the average distance from the government, i.e.,
heterogeneity increases.
4Amore general specification would be to impox K = a + ~s wheres is the size of the country. As long as a >0
our results would be qualitatively unchangd.
5S= Alesina and Spolaore (1995) and Spolaore(1995b) for more discussion on this point,
6See Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1992) for an empirical discussion of regional insurance schemes in the US.5
We now consider the role of international conflict and defense spending. Individual
resources Zi are divided into two components:
zi=y+ei (2)
y is individual income (equal for everybody), which is “safe” from the consequences of
conflict; ei is the expected amount of resources available to individual i afier a @ossible)
international conflict is resolved.
Conflict is modeled as follows. Individuals are randomly matched pairwise. When
a pair (i, j) meets, the two individuals generate a pool of resources equal to 2 e which has
to be divided. There are two possible states: conflict (c) and no conflict (n c). In a state
of nc resources are distributed (peacefully) and equally:
ei=ej=e (3)
We assume that:
Al: If two individuals who belong to the same country meet, they are always in a
state of no conpict,
If two individuals, i andj, who do not belong to the same country meet, they can either be
in conflict or in no conflict, in which case (3) applies. Conflict occurs with probability
p (i, j) . The following assumption generates a role for defense spending:6
A2: IfconJict occurs, the share of individual i depends on the defense spending
of his count~, relative to defense spending of the count~ of individual j:
(4)
where di (d~) is the defense spending in the country of individual i ~) and $’> 0 .
The rationale behind these assumptions should be clear. Al rules out domestic
conflict. In fact we could assume an additional cost for a country for internal “law and
ordef’ and conflict resolution (courts, legal system etc.). If this cost were increasing in the
size of the country, it would provide an additional argument for the costs of size, in addition
to the “average distance” argument emphasized above. If these costs were linear, our results
would be completely unaffected, If these costs were decreasing in the size of countries (i.e.,
economies of scale in law and order) they would provide an additional benefit for size.
The second assumption borrows from the literature on conflict resolution, and in
partictiar horn Tullock (1980), Hirshleifer (1989, 1995) and Gtilnkel (1994). The idea is
that the benefits for the individuals of a certain coun~ in case of international conflict are
increasing in the military strength of the country relative to the opponent. We are assuming
that spending on defense translates into military strength. Thus we are abstracting from
Merent ‘productivities’ of defense spending in different countries. “Conflict” in our model
should be interpreted quite generally as a war (cold or hot), military “muscle flexing” or7
simply the weight in international Dade bargainkg tables tising from a COUW’S s~ength.
~us, the potential conflict be~een two individuals may stem Eroma bade re~ationship, or
from conflicting interests on natural resources and/or other economic ~d noneconomic
issues
.43
A4
For ratability we make LWO simp[ifiing assumptions:
$ (d. = d,
p (i)J) = p for every Ilj
(5)
(6)
me second one represents a drastic simplification since it implies that all individuals
have the same probability of being matched. Hence, it implies that tie probability of a
match is independent of the distance between the pair, and independent of the coun~ of
origin of the two individuals.’ Extensions on this point would substantially complicate
notations and computations, but should not change the qualitative nature of our results.
Suppose that he wor{d is divided in N countries, indexed by h, of size
Sll ‘ h= 1 , . . . N. Then, the value of e, is given by:
s}! ‘ d,,
e,=[l-( l-s~)p]e+ (l- ~h)Pz ~ — 2e
- ~,, d,, + dj,, /1’=[1
[or Jn individual i belonging [o country h.
(7)
‘This assump~ion is malo~ouY [o tie asjump[ion of ““panmictic m~lchin~” which i~ standard in [IIC [orrnol
biulo~icol li[crntuc: “... Pmixi~ means lhu[ each rcprduc[ivcly ma[urc male is cclually Iikcly to mate witi each
rcpdKUVcly ma[urc [cmulc, regardless of lhcir Iwa[ion wiIhin lhc r~~c 0( tic dcmc. Al{hou@ not Iikcly IObe a[[aincd
in Ubsolutc fom in nature .,, panmixia is an impo~an[ simpli~yin~ assumption made in much of cicmenlary quanll~alive
ticory” (wilMn, 1980, p.8).8
The f~st term in (7) represents the payoff of no conflict (e) multiplied by the likelihood
of either not being matched with a foreigner, or being matched peacefully with a foreigner.
The second terms represent the probability of being matched to a foreigner with conflict
[(1 - s~) p] multiplied by the outcome of conflict, which depends on relative defense
d.
spending ( ) multiplied by the probability of meeting citizens of the various
d. + d~,
ShI
countries (
I-sh
).
Finally, for country h, extending from borders
~
to ~ , the budget constraints is given by:
(8)
Equation (8) indicates that the total tax revenues have to equal the total of non defense
spending (K) and defense spending (dA ).
3. Voting on Government and Defense
Individuals vote by majority n.de on the location (type) of govement and on the size
of defense. We make the following two assumptions:
A5 Voting on the location of government and the size of defewe occur after the country
borders hme been established,
This is a natural assumption since it implies that policy decisions on the type of
govement and the amount of defense spending can be taken only after a country is created.
A6 In each country, trees are the same for everyone.9
Two observations emerge immediately from the structure of the model:
i) For given borders, every citizen has the same preferences on the optimal
amount of defense; and
ii) The govement is located in the middle of the country,
The first observation derives from the fact, embodied in (7), that every individual has the
sme probability of meeting a foreigner and individual payoffs all depend identically on the
country’s aggregate level of defense. This result would not hold if, for instance, individuals
close to the borders had a higher change of engaging in conflicts with foreigners. In the
latter case, border individuals would prefer a higher spending on defense.
The second result derives from a straightforward application of the median voter
theorem over the choice of location of the govement, noting that this choice, by
assumption, does not influence individuals’ taxes, nor their desired amount of defense.
Assumption A6 implies that taxes cannot be a function of the (unique) parameter which
varies across individuds: the distance from the government. This assumption can be justified
in two ways. First, to the extent that individual location captures a preference dimension,
unobservability of preferences would imply that taxes linked to preferences are generally
unfeasible.g Second, Alesina and Spolaore (1995) derive this assumption as a result of a
realistic voting process on the distribution of the tax burden. With the same tax for
eve~one, individuals close to the government are better off than those far from it. If taxes
eWe do not explore here a comection with the literature on revelation mechanisms,10
were decided by majority vote, those individuals who are fw from the govement would
favor tax compensation schemes in their favor. Such schemes might also enforce larger
countries, by keeping border individuals “in”, with tax advantages. Alesina and Spolaore
(1995) consider linear taxation schemes, where the tax rate is a linear tiction of the distance
from the govermnent. They show that, under some weak assumptions, if voting on taxes
occurs after country borders are decided (exactly as assumption A5 requires), then the voting
equilibrium implies the same tax for everyone and the government located in the middle.
The intuition is that for given borders, fifty percent of the voters (those with a distance from
the government above average) wodd like to maximize compensations. The other half
would want to minimize them. The tie is broken if one assumes even infinitesimal
implementation costs of these tiansfer schemes. In summary, under realistic assumptions on
the order of voting, a majority would favor equal taxes. Thus, A6 could be derived as a
result rather than imposed as an assumption. Since our focus here is not on compensation
schemes, we simply impose A6 from the start.
With taxes equal for every citizen the budget constraint for country h of size s~
implies:
K+dh
th = (9)
‘h
The f~st order condition which determines the desired amount of defense by each individual
of country h is obtained using (l), (7), and (9) as follows:11
1 d:
-_ +Px ~j 2e=0
‘h h’=h (dh + d;)’
(lo)
Equation (10) shows that the marginal costs of an extra unit of defense spending (equal to
1
7from (9)) have to equal the marginal benefits, in terms of a higher ‘prize’ in case of
‘h
conflicts, which is the second term in (10) obtained from (7).
4. The Equilibrium Number of Countries
We now characterize an equilibrium number of countries. In the next section we
discuss its stability, including the possibility of unilateral secessions. The first requirement
which we impose on an equilibrium configuration of borders is the following:
Requirement 1: No individual (or group of individuals) can be forced to belong to an
existing country if he prefers to belong to a different one.
This feature of equilibrium is a benchmark, in which countries cannot impose
restrictions on individuals who want to join or exit. Remember that individuals are not
physically mobile. Thus “joining a country” means moving the border of that country. This
requirement implies a condition of indifference at the border: the individual at the border
must be indifferent on the choice of which coun~ to belong to. The following result is
immediate:
Proposition 1.
Countries of equal size, with the government located in the middle and with the same
amount of defense spending, satisfi Requirement 1.1 does
12
The proof is immediate, remembering that everyone pays the same tax. Proposition
not imply that the only type of equilibria which satisfies Requirement 1 has countries
of equal size. We return on this point in section 5 in the context of our discussion of
stibility. Note, however, that given our assumption of uniform distribution of individuals,
equilibria with equally-sized countries are the natural candidates. In turn, if all the countries
have equal size, the natural candidates for an equilibrium is the symmetric one, with each
country spending the same amount on defense. Using (10), the symmetric equilibria
countries of equal size s (so that N = ~) implies that each country spends
s
defense:
~.=s(l–s)pe
2
with N
d“ in
(11)
Several observations are in order. First, the equilibrium amount of defense is
increasing in the probability of conflict. Not surprisingly, it is also increasing in the amount
of the payoff from conflict e.
country in the world, since, by
which is:
Second, defense spending is zero when there is only one
deftition, there is no conflict. Third, defense pro capita,
d“ (1 -s)pe —=
s 2
(12)
is decreasing with coun~ size. Larger countries have, in equilibrium, a lower per capita
defense bill. Fourth, since defense is, from the point of view of global efficiency, pure13
waste, individual utility would be maximized if p = O and d * = O. In fact, if p > 0
and d~ = d * for every country using (7) one can verifi that ei = e for every i, exactly
as in the case of p = O. When p > 0, however, the “price” of the payoff e is the per capita
cost of defense given in (12). Obviously, we have a suboptimd Nash equilibrium on defense
spending.
Empirically, the relationship between country size and defense per capita is
influenced by two critical factors which our model does not capture: the existence of military
alliances, and the fact that smaller members of an alliance can free ride on the defense
capabilities of the larger member(s).9 Both considerations are very important, and we do not
mean to downplay them. However, we see our model as a stepping stone upon which to
build these additional realistic features.
We now consider border redrawing by majority rule. We allow the existing countries
to eliminate a country or create a new country if the border change is approved by majority
rule in each of the countries whose borders are affected by the change. We restrict voting
only on proposals of border redrawing which satis& Requirement 1.
R~uirewnt 2. Given a cotilguration of countries that satisfies Requirement 1, in at least
one country a majority should oppose any proposal to redraw borders so that a new country
is created or eliminated. Only proposals that satis~ Requirement 1 are admissible.
~or a survey of the literature on this point, see Sandier and Hartley (1995).14
In other words, this requirement implies that in an equilibrium at least one country
would veto any border rearrangement. Thus, we are trying to capture situations like
referenda on the choice of joining politico-economic unions (like the European Union), or
post-war international conferences to settle border disputes, or, more generally, border
remangements which are the result of some form of international agreement, rather than the
result of unilateral secessions, which we study in the next section.
fioposition 2.
The number of equally-sized countries which satis>es Requirement 2 is given by the
integer that is closest to.”
4
g-pe
2K
(13)
Proofi See Appendix.
For the sake of simplicity in exposition, from now we will abstract from the integer
condition and assume that fi =
J
g-pe .
1sthe equilibrium number of countries.
2K
Corollary: The equilibrium number of countries is decreasing with the probability
of conflict. The size of countries is increasing with the pro babili~ of conflict.
This is one of the critical results of the paper: it implies that a sharp decrease in the
probability of conflict would result in the break-up of countries. Two forces underlie this15
inverse relationship between p and fi. First, if p increases, an individual would like to
belong to a larger country in order to reduce the probability of “being matched” with
foreigners. Second, since defense spending increases in p and defense per capita is
decreasing in larger countries, the benefits of size increase. If we view the end of the cold
ww as a large drop inp, the model predicts that the creation of new countries should go hand
in hand with the end of the cold war.
One codd expect that a large fall in the probability of conflict p (The “end of the cold
war,” should bring about a more peaceful world and a “peace dividend”, namely a reduction
in the per capita cost of defense. However, the emergence of several local conflicts cast
doubt on the fist implicatio~ and the “peace dividend” has been slow in materializing. Our
model is consistent with both these rather sad observations.
Let’s begin with the amount of world coflict. Define the mass of observable conflict
M. We have that:
M@) =p (1 -F(p))
where F(p) is the equilibrium size of countries Thus, from Proposition 2:
(14)
(15)16
Proposition 3
The mms of international conjlicts is increasing in p if and on~ #
F@) <
g-pe
g - pe12
Proofi From (14):
h-(p) M(p) =l_i@)-p dp
dp
(16)
(17)
substitute S(p) and ‘{@) using (15) to obtain (16). Q.E.D.
dp
The intuition of Proposition 3 is that a reduction in p has two effects. For a given
size of countries, it reduces the mass of international conflict. This direct effect is larger the
smaller is s, namely the larger the “mass” of international “matches”, relative to domestic
“matches”. The second, and indirect effect, is that a reduction in p reduces the size of
countries, thus it increases the mass of international interactions that can, potentially, lead
to conflict. As equation (16) shows, for F small the direct effect dominates, for ~ large it
does not. Therefore, stig from a world with a few large countries a reduction
leads to the formation of many new countries may actually increase the mass
conflicts.
in p which
of observed17
A similar intuition underlies the effect of a reduction of p on defense spending per
capita. From (12) it follows that:
a(d”ls) _ (1 -s) e _ pe ds
ap - 2 2 dp
(18)
The fust term is the direct positive effect of a change in p on defense per capita: a
lower p leads to lower defense. The second term, with the opposite sign, is the indirect
effect due to the consequences of a change in p on the size of countries. Equation (18)
leads to the following:
Proposition 4.
A reduction in p determines a reduction of defense per capita if and on~ #
f(p) <
g-pe
g - pef2
(19)
Thus, a reduction of p may actually lead to an increase in defense spending per
capita because countries become smaller, More generally, even when (19) holds, so that
lower p means lower defense, the model emphasizes a channel (through the size of
d“
counties) which reduces the effect of p on — .
s18
5. Stability
In this section we consider the issue of stability of the equilibrium both to small
perturbations and to unilateral secessions. We begin with small perturbations in which one
border is moved slightly, so that a small mass e of population changes country.
Requirement 3 ( E-Stability): A configuration of countries is stible if afier a small e
perturbation of the border between two countries, the original equilibrium is re-established.
Consider a cotilguration of N countries of equal size. We know that this con-
figuration of borders satisfies Requirement 1. But is it stable? Suppose, without loss of
generality, that starting from the equilibrium with N countries of size s = ~ , country 1
N
is reduced to size s~ =S– E and country 2 to size s; =s+C. Would the
original equilibrium be restored? Namely, would the mass of individual c want to return
to country 1? When the size of two countries changes the following adjustments occur:
i) the type (location) of government in country 1 and 2:
ii) the defense spending of countries 1 and 2; and
iii) the defense spending of all the other (N - 2) countries.10
Intuitively, the third adjustment is “second order,” particularly for N large. In fact, looking
at the first order condition (equation (10)) one immediately verifies that the (N - 2)
countries not tiected by the border perturbation change their choice only marginally because
‘Note that the location-type of government in these (N - 2) countries does not change, because their borders do
not change.19
the size of the other two countries have been reshuffled. We can obtain analytical results
under the sirnpli~ing assumption that the third type of adjustment is zero, namely the
(N - 2) countries not tiected by the border change maintain their defense spending fixed.
In this case we can show the following:
Proposition 5.
Consider a configuration of N equally sized countries. If all the (N - 2) countries
not @fected by the border change maintain their level of defense >xed, the smallest size of
countries which is stable, ;, is afunction of p, ; @) such that:
i(o) < f(p) p>o
a~@) > ()
ap -
Proofi See Appendix.
(20)
Thus, the minimum stable size is (weakly) increasing p. If p is high, small
countries are not stable in the sense that if a perturbation makes one country larger, the
citiens of the neighboring smaller countries would want to join the bigger country, because
defense is too expensive in the smaller country, Thus, the implication of Proposition 5 is
that, even leaving aside Requirement 2, the minimum stable size of countries (weakly)20
increases in p: with a higher probability of conflict, the minimum stable size of countries
is lager, 11
We can now extend our analysis of Requirement 2 to the case where we explicitly
take into account the issue of c- stability. Namely we modi~ Requirement 2 as follows:
Requirement 2‘: Given a cotilguration of countries that satisfies Requirement 3, in
at least one country a majority should oppose any proposal to redraw borders so that a new
country is created or eliminated. Only proposals which satisfi Requirement 1 and 3 are
admissible.
Numerical simulations described in Appendix show the following:
Results.
a) The maximum number of equally-sized countries that satisfies Requirement 3 is
decreasing in p;
b) The number of equally-sized countries N that satisfies Requirement 2’ is the integer
I I
closest to
4
~ (Or, for small values of pe, the largest integer smaller than
2K 4
~ )
4
For large values of g ~Kpe , we can ignore the integer condition and approximate
the number of countries that satisfies Requirement 2’ by I =
r
g ~Kpe . This number,
therefore, not only approximates the equilibrium number of countries that satisfies
“Of course, it is possible that small increases in p leave the equilibrium size unchanged21
Requirements 1 and 2, but also the stable number of countries that satisfies Requirements 3
and 2’,
We now turn to the issue of stability to unilateral secessions. A unilateral secession
occurs when a (connected) set of individuals belonging to an existing country unilaterally
forms a new country,
Definition: A country of size s is secession free, ~fno group of citizens would want to
unilaterally break away andform a new count~.
First of all, note that if a secession occurs, three adjustments have to occur:
i) the location of govement and defense spending of the new country;
ii) the location of government and the defense spending of the country which has been
split, and
iii) the defense spending of all the other countries not affected by the secession.
While for the case of the e- stability the third adjustment was “second order,” this is
not the case for (potentially large) unilateral secessions. Thus, we cannot derive results
analogous to Proposition 5.
Note that the individuals with the highest incentives to break away are those located
far away from the government near the borders of the original country, In fact, for given
country size, and given size of a secession, those who gain the most are those who were far
from the original government and are much closer to the government of the new country.
Clearly, the possibility of secessions impose an upper limit on country size. If a country is
too large, a fraction of its citizens at the border would break away because they are so far22
from the government that they are willing to bear the costs of a higher defense bill and total
tax per capita, and lower total defense in a conflictual world.
The fist question which we ask is whether the configuration of R countries of equal
1 size~.y is secession free. Numerical simulations described in the Appendix show the
N
following results:
Result. The size ~ is secession free.
The simtiations imply a search over a grid of values for possible secession sizes. We
then check whether or not all the individuals in the proposed break away region are better
off after the secession. A country is secession free if we cannot fmd a size for a possible
secession in which all the individuals who are breaking away are better off. Note that this
procedure implies (rather realistically) that nobody can be forced to unilaterally break away
from an existing country against his will.
A second interesting question is the following. Leaving aside Requirement 2, what
is the relationship between p and the minimum size which is secession free? By numerical
simulations, described in Appendix we obtain the following:
Result: The maximum size that is secession free is increasing in p.
In other words, when the probability of a conflict increases, larger countries that
would not have been secession-free for a smaller p become secession free. Conversely, a
sharp drop in p would induce certain regions to secede, which would not have seceded with
a higher p. Therefore, even leaving aside the equilibrium number of countries ~ obtained23
applying Requirement 2, this result on secessions establishes that one should observe a
break-up of countries when, for whatever reason, the probability of conflict decreases.
This observation is quite important because it underlies the generality
relationship between country size and probability of international conflict.
of the direct
In fact, this
relationship emerges simply as a result of the secession-free requirement, regardless of any
other requirement which (like Requirement 2) identifies a specific equilibrium number of
countries.
6. Conclusions
This paper provides a model consistent with three obsemations. First, secessions and,
more generally, break-up of countries should go hand in hand with a reduction of
international conflict, Second, the number of conflicts among small countries may go up,
as a result of the break-up of previous larger political units, Third, the size of the ‘peace
dividend’ is influenced by the process of country break-up which follows the reduction in
the likelihood of international conflict.
While these implications of the model appear quite consistent with recent events, we
should emphasize several limitations of our approach. First and foremost, we have
completely ignored the role of alliances and the related problem of free riding in defense
spending by smaller members. To some extent, one can reinterpret the ‘country’ of our
model as a group of allied countries, and view our model of country formation as a model
of alliance formation, However, the analogy can be pushed only to a point, because critical24
issues of bargaining (and fi-eeriding) amongst allied countries cannot be addressed. Second,
our model of conflict is somewhat rudimentary, since we assumed that the probability of
conflict amongst citizens of different countries is the same around the world. It could be
interesting to consider extensions in which the probability of conflict between groups of
individuals may depend on their geographical and/or preference distance, and/or on other
political, economic and social characteristics. Third, we almost exclusively focused on
symmetric equilibria. Fourth, the equilibrium concepts we have used to determine the
endogenous configuration of countries are based on “self determination” and voting
mechanisms. Although these concepts may be appropriate to study a completely democratic
worl~ they are fa from realistic, especially in situations of international conflict. However,
the general principles behind our results are likely to be robust with respect to different
specifications of the process of country formation. For instance, Spolaore (1995a) derives
similar restits for the case of a world in which governments are modeled as rent-maximizing
Leviathans. Fifth, our assumption concerning the identity between the geographic and
preference dimension excludes the consideration of ethnic minorities. In the context of our
model, in fact an ethnic minority could be viewed as a group of individuals with preferences
very different from those of individuals on their right and left geographically. In reality, the
existence of ethnic minorities is a critical determinant of both country formation and
secessions and of regional conflicts, More generally, focusing on continuous, uniform
distinctions of individual characteristics allows us to study some important and robust
relationships between conflict, defense and country size with the minimum amount of25
notational and analytical complexity. However, additional insights can probably be obtained
by extending and modifiing the basic framework in order to allow for asymmetries and
discontinuities. These extensions are lefi for fiture research.
Despite all these caveats, the contribution of this paper consists in building if not a
bridge at least a wire between the literature on country formation and the literature on
international conflict and defense spending.26
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let lj~{~ denote the distance of individual i, belonging to country h, from his
coun~’s government when the world is divided in N countries of equal size s = 1~, and
let ti~{N) denote the taxes paid by i . Each individual i in country h will prefer N to N+]
countries if and ordy if
tih {~ + glih{~ s tihl{N+l} + glihl{N+l}
That is:
tti, {N+l } - ti~{N} > g[li~ {N} - li~,{N+l }]
Since:
ti~{N} =NK+(l -~)~
N2
l)E ti~{N+l} = (N+l) K + (1 - —
N+l 2
we have that, for every individual i in each country h:
(Al)
(A.2)
(A.3)
(A.4)ti~,{N+l ] - ti~{N} = K + ‘e
2N(N+ 1)
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(A.5)
Denote with 1~~{N} - Id, {N+ 1}the median distance change in country h. It can
be shown12 that the median distance change is the same in all countries, and equal to:
Hence, N is always prefemed to N + 1 in all countries if and only ifi
K+ ‘e g
2N(N+I) 2 2N(N+ 1)
which is satisfied if and only if
N(N+ 1) > g ~Kpe
(A.6)
(A.7)
(A.8)
Analogously, each individual i in country h will prefer N to N-1 if and only if
12Aproof by instruction is provided in Alesina and Spolaore (1995), Appendix, Lernrna 128
ti~{N} + gli~l {N} ~ ti~{N- 1} + g[li~l {N-1} - li~{N}] (A.9)
That is:
tih {N) - tih,{N-l} s g [Iih,{N-1] - lin {~] (A.1O)
It is immediate to veri~ that, for every i in each country h, we have:
‘i~{N} - tihl{~-l) = K + pe 2N(N-1 )
(All)
N will satis~ requirement 2 only if there exists at least one country h in which:
K+ ‘e
2N(N- 1)
< g [lmhI{N-1} - ~mh {N}] (A.12)
It can be shown13 that, for any N, the maximum median distance change
1~~,{N-1} - 1~~{N} is given by:
13Aproof by construction is provided in Alesina and Spolaore (1995), Appendix, Lernrna 2,Id, {N-l) - 2A{N} = 1
2N(N- 1)
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(A.13)
Therefore, there exists no country h in which the median voter prefers N-1 to N if and only
if
K+ ‘e g
2N(N- 1) < 2N(N-1 )
which is satisfied if and only if
N(N-1) s g ~Kpe
(A.14)
(A.15)
Hence, N satisfies requirement 2 if and only if it satisfies both (A.8) and (A, 15). The
integer that satisfies both equations is the integer closest to
r
g-pe
2K
Q.E.D.30
Proof of Proposition 5.
h order to prove Proposition 5 we fust need to prove a Lemma. Define as d{ and
d; the defense spending in coun~ 1 and 2 afier the c - perturbation. Remember that
/
S1 =s–&, s2’= S+E, and that we are assuming that di i= 3,.. . N remain
S(~-s)pe=d
unchanged, so that di =
2
Lemma:
Proof. Using the fust order conditions, (10), after some algebra, one obtains the following
system of equations in d[ and d; :
[
(S+c) (1-2s) d
d;
I
1
+ (s–&) =—
(d: + d)2 (d: + d;)’ 2p e
(A.16)
I
(S-E) (1-2s) d
1
d~_l
+ (S+E) —— (A.17)
(d; + d)2 (d[ + d~)2 2p e
Differentiate both sides with respect to E, noting that the right hand side of (A. 16) and
(A. 17) are a constant. Then evaluate the two expressions at E = O, noting that at
c= Od[=d2’=d.
We obtain:31
ad;
(1-2s) ad; 1 ac .0
—–s—
4d2 ~ - 4d 4d2
(A.18)
ad;
[-
(1-2s) + sII
(1 -2s) ad; 1 aE .0 (A.19)
—— —
4d %+s - 4d2 de 4d-s 4d2
Solving, one obtains:
ad; _=l-2sd
ac 1-s;
(A.20)
ad: _=_l-2sd
a&
(A.21)
1-s;
Fors<~ (A20) is positive and (A21) is negative. Using (A20) and (A21), and evaluating
at c = O one obtains:
[1
dd:/s: 1 ad: d: d= F<() —— —= — (A.22)
a& ‘—S+C ac ‘+& ‘(l-s) - 2
[1
dd;/s[ 1 ad: d: d ._ Pe>() —— —=
a& ‘—S-E ac s–c ‘(l-s) 2
(A.23)
Equations (A20), (A21), (A22) and (A23) imply the Lemma. Q.E.D.32
Inwords, for a small perturbation of the border between two countries, total defense
is larger in the larger country, but defense per capita, thus taxes per capita are higher in the
smaller country. We are now ready to prove the Proposition.
Define F(0) as the minimum stable size, for p = O. From the results of Alesina
and Spolaore (1995) we know that for p = O, F(O) = l/~, where N is the largest integer
g Firs$wewantto prove that f@) > ~(0) foranyp >0. Ifp = O
the condition for stability can be written as follows:
s-& K
g(y)-— ~)+L <g(?
s–c s+&
Suppose now that F(p) < f(0) , For some p >0 , choose s‘
(A.24)
such that
f~) < s’ < ~ (0) . Consider the c perturbation when s = s’ , Since s’ < F(O) if
p = O the individual atthe new border prefa the bigger coun@. Since s ‘> F(p) forp >0
the border individual prefers the smaller country, This is a contradiction, since if p > 0
defense pro capi~ thus taxes per capita, are higher in the smaller country and total defense,
thus the expected revenue from conflict, are lower in the smaller coun~. Thus if the
individual at the border
country for p = O
between counties of size s‘ + c and s‘ - c prefers the bigger
he cannot prefer the smaller country for p >0. Thus,
~(p) z F(O) forp > 0. Consider now p‘ > p. A similar argument based on
contradiction establishes that f (p’) > s (p); thus it follows that the fmction f(p) is
weakly increasing in p, Q.E.D.33
Numerical simulations
~- Stability.
Consider N countries of equal sizes = lN. Suppose that a small perturbation takes
place al
s: =s+
the border between country 1 and coun~ 2, so that S/ = s - E md
c. The other N-2 counties remain of size s. All countries adjust their defense
spending tier the perturbation. New defense spending in country 1 (2) will be denoted by
d{ (d;). Defense spending in the remaining N-2 countries is denoted by d’. Then, d{ , d;
and d‘ are given as follows:
d: d:
d; = argma { 2pe (s+E) — + 2pe(N-2)s —
d~+d~ d:+dl
d; d;
d; = argmm { 2pe(s-c) — + 2pe(N–2)s
d:+d~ d; + dt
dl dl=argmax { 2pe(s-c)— d’ d’ +2pe(s+c)— +2pe(N-3)s —-~}
d[+dl d:+dl di+~l S
The fust-order conditions are:34
d;
2pe (s+&) d’_l
+ 2pe (1-2s) ——
(d[+d:)’ (d[+dl)z S-&
d;
2pe (s-e) d[
+ 2pe(l–2s) 1 =—
(d~+d~)2 (d;+d’)’ S +E
(A.25)
(A.26)
d; d;
2pe(s-E) 1 + 2pe(s+e) + 2pe(l-3s) — = ~
(d~+d’)2
(A.27)
(d~+d’)’ 4d~ s
For any given vector of parameters @e, g, ~ and for any given configuration of N
countries of size s = l/N, it is possible to calculate the amount of defense per capita,
(A.28)
that would be chosen, respectively, in country 1, country 2, and in the remaining N-2
muntries when the border between coun~ 1and coun~ 2 isperturbate~ sothat a fraction e = Is
of the population of country 1joins country 2, where 1 is a number much smaller than 1.
These values can be obtained by solving the system (A-25 )-(A-27) numerically. Table 1
shows the values of ~~, ~~, and d~, for p e = 500.
By using the above defense values, we can then calculate the utility U[ (u;) of the
individual at the border between country 1 and coun~ 2 if she belongs to country 1 (country35
2). In general, these utilities are given as follows:
d: d: K
U( = [l-p(l-(s -e))] e+2pe [(s+c)
d,+d(]-
+(1–2s) , —
d[ +d; s–&
d{ s–c ——-g~
s–&
UJ = [1 -p(l - (s + e))]e (A.29)
d:
I
d:+d]-
K
+ 2pe [(s – c) +(1–2s) 2 —
d[ + d[ s+&
d; s+c
-—-g? s+&
The values of u{ and u; are reported in Tables 1 and 2 for different values of g and K. If
U( > u; , the individual at the border would like to join the smaller country. In this case,
the original cotilguration would be stable. By contrast, if u: < u;, the individual at the
border would like to join the larger country, henceforth ampli~ing the perturbation. In the
latter case, the original cotilguration is not stable (i.e., it does not satisfi Requirement 3).
Tables 1 and 2 indicate with “1” whether U( > u;, (stability) and with “O” the opposite
case (instability), for different values of g, when pe = 500 and
K = 0.5 (Table 1) and K = 4 (Table 2) .
For any given value of the vector (pe, g, K), we can then find the maximum N that
satisfies Requirement 3, i.e., that is stable (note that if N is stable, so is N-1). Let Nc denote
the maximum number of equally-sized countries that satisfies Requirement 3, i.e., that is
stable (or, more specifically, c-stable).36
Table 3 shows the values of NEfor different values of the parameters @e, g, ~.
d
g-pe
Denote withN’ the largest integer smaller than — and withN” tie integer that is
r
2K ‘
g ‘P e It is immediate to notice that: closest to
T“
1) N’ is decreasing in pe. This result is illustrated in Figures 1-4 for selected
values of g and K.
2) N’ is always c-stable; N“ is e-stable for values of pe larger than the
critical value p= defined by the following equation: 14
(A.30)
Hence, if N“ is e-stable, the number N which satisfies Requirement 2’is equal to N“.
Otherwise, it is equal to N’, which is always stable.
Secession-Free Equilibria
Consider N countries of equal sizes. Consider a secession of size z taking place in
country 1. Then, we have a new coun~ of size z spending dZ in defense. The rest of
country 1,being now of size s-z, spending dJ_Z in defense, and the remaining N-1 countries,
“For i.nstana, in table 3 (K= 0,5), for g = 800, the critical p=is 400; for g = 1600, the critical p=is 700, etc.37
of sizes = IN, spending d’ in defense. dZ, d. _Z and d‘ are given by the following first
order conditions (as long as the system has strictly positive solutions) 15:
d
2p e(s -z)
s –z dt
+ 2pe (l-s) .J
(dz + d )2 s–z
(d + d1)2 Z
z
dz
2pe z dt 1
+ 2pe (1 -s) =—
(dz +d )2 s-z (d - + dt)2 S-Z Sz
(A.31)
dz d + 2pe(l -s) _ 1 2pe z + 2pe (s -z)
s-z ——
(d + d1)2 (dS_z + d’)2 4dl s
z
For any z s s/2, let UM denote the status-quo utility of an individual located at a distance
s/2-z from the center, that is:
d“ un =e+g(l-(~-z)) -~-—
s
(A.32)
Let USdenote the utility of that same individual should a secession of size z occur, so that
he wotid be located at the border between the new country of size z and the rest of his old
country, now of size s-z:
dz dz
Us=p(s-z) 2e + p(N-l)s — 2e
dz + dS_z dZ+d’
+(1- p(l-z)) e+g (l-~)----
z z
(A.33)
‘sThe renditions that characterize the comer solutions are available upon request.38
This individual would be in favor of (against) a unilateral secession of size z as long as u.
is smaller (larger) than us , and be indifferent in the case u~ = us. For a given
configuration of N countries of size s = IN, we can calculate the values of
u. and usassociated with different possible secessions of size z = 1s, where k takes
different values between Oand 0,5. Similar calctiations, mutatis mutatiis, can be performed
for values of A larger than 0.5. If u. is smaller than u~for some values of A, that
configuration will not be secession free. On the other hand, if for every A u~ z us, we can
say thats = l/N is secession-free.
Table 4 shows the values of defense per capita and of u~and u~for g = 800, K = 0.5,
and pe = 50. The k’s take values between .05 and .516 In this example, s = 1/2 ands = 1/3
(N= 2 andN = 3) are not secession tiee. Up to 25% of the citizens of each country of size
s would be happier if they could form a smaller country on their own. Secessions of size
1/40, 1/20, 15/200, 1/10 and 1/8 would all be approved unanimously by the relevant subset
of citizens. s = 1/4 (N= 4) is not secession-free either, because up to 20°/0 of the citizens of
each country of size s would like to form a smaller country. N = 5 is not secession free
because secessions of size z = s/10 = 1/50 and z = .15s = 3/100 would be unanimously
prefen-ed by the relevant fi-actions of the population. By contrast, values of N larger than 5
are secession free.
‘GFor tils specific example, no secession would ever occur for ~ > 0.5. This turns out to be true in all our
calculations for N >2, In some cases, when N = 2, a majority of the original population may want to secede and form a
smaller nation,39
In general, ifN is secession-free, so is N+l, For each value of the parameters (g, K,
pe), we can calctiate the minimum N that is secession-free. In Tables 5 and 6, the minimum
N that is secession fi-ee is denoted by N*, and is calculated for different values of the
parameters. In particular, we fmd that:
n Nkis decreasing in pe. This result is illustrated in Figures 5-7,
n J
The largest integer smaller than g ~KPe is always secession free,40
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g=800
K = 0.5
pe = 50
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d2
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us
un~us
12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12,5 12.5
0 0 8.29 14.50 17.35 18.65 19.15 19.18 18.94 18.51
12.50 12.50 13.17 14.12 15.00 15.83 16.59 17.31 17.95 18.51
11,87 11.25 11.29 11.60 11.82 11,99 12.11 12.19 12.24 12.26
608 628 648 668 688 708 728 748 768 78a
722 724 719 715 710 704 698 691 684 677
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
16.67 16.67 16.67 16.67 16.67 16.67 16.67 16.67 16.67 16.67
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725 730 736 742 748 753 759 765 770 776
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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